Discrete Optimization

Approximation Randomized Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game withWeighted Agents

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Online published: 2016-09-30

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the obnoxious facility location game with weighted agents. First, we design a randomized group strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 3Wmax/2Wmin when the weighted agents are located on a line; then, on the cycle metric, we also discuss the strategy-proofness and the approximation ratios of a class of group strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms.

Cite this article

Lan Xiao, Xiao-Zhi Zhang . Approximation Randomized Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game withWeighted Agents[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2016 , 4(3) : 357 . DOI: 10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3

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