Journal of the Operations Research Society of China
Special Issue: Management Science
• Discrete Optimization • Previous Articles Next Articles
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Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the obnoxious facility location game with weighted agents. First, we design a randomized group strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 3Wmax/2Wmin when the weighted agents are located on a line; then, on the cycle metric, we also discuss the strategy-proofness and the approximation ratios of a class of group strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms.
Key words: Obnoxious facility game ·Weighted agents ·, Approximation mechanisms design without money ·, Strategy-proof
Lan Xiao, Xiao-Zhi Zhang. Approximation Randomized Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game withWeighted Agents[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, doi: 10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3.
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URL: https://www.jorsc.shu.edu.cn/EN/10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3
https://www.jorsc.shu.edu.cn/EN/Y2016/V4/I3/357