Journal of the Operations Research Society of China ›› 2026, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (2): 591-602.doi: 10.1007/s40305-024-00565-w

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An Approximation Theorem and Generic Uniqueness of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium for Multiobjective Population Games

Hua-Xin Chen1,2, Wen-Sheng Jia1,2   

  1. 1 School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyan 550025, Guizhou, China;
    2 Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory for Games Decision-Making and Control Systems, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China
  • Received:2023-11-15 Revised:2024-08-27 Online:2026-06-30 Published:2026-07-06
  • Contact: Wen-Sheng Jia E-mail:wsjia@gzu.edu.cn
  • Supported by:
    This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 12061020), the Science and Technology Foundation of Guizhou Province (No. 20215640).

Abstract: We mainly study an approximation theorem and generic uniqueness of weakly ParetoNash equilibrium (PNE) for multiobjective population games. First, we define the concept of approximate weakly PNE of multiobjective population games. Then, an approximation theorem is proved under very mild conditions. Furthermore, we prove the generic uniqueness of weakly PNE for multiobjective population games by establishing a function space. Finally, we obtain the generic uniqueness of weakly PNE for multiobjective population games in the case of function perturbation. The above results are new and improve the related results of the recent literature.

Key words: Multiobjective population game, Approximation theorem, Weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium

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