Game Theory and the Evolution of Cooperation

doi:10.1007/s40305-021-00350-z

Abstract

Abstract: Evolution is based on the competition between individuals and therefore rewards only selfish behavior. How cooperation or altruism behavior could prevail in social dilemma then becomes a problematic issue. Game theory offers a powerful mathematical approach for studying social behavior. It has been widely used to explain the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we first introduce related static and dynamic game methods. Then we review two types of mechanisms that can promote cooperation in groups of genetically unrelated individuals, (i) direct reciprocity in repeated games, and (ii) incentive mechanisms such as reward and punishment.

Key words: Cooperation, Game theory, Direct reciprocity, Reward, Punishment

CLC Number:

91A80

Bo-Yu Zhang, Shan Pei. Game Theory and the Evolution of Cooperation[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2022, 10(2): 379-399.

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