An Approximation Theorem and Generic Uniqueness of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium for Multiobjective Population Games

doi:10.1007/s40305-024-00565-w

Journal of the Operations Research Society of China ›› 2026, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (2): 591-602.doi: 10.1007/s40305-024-00565-w

收稿日期:2023-11-15 修回日期:2024-08-27 出版日期:2026-06-30 发布日期:2026-07-06
通讯作者: Wen-Sheng Jia E-mail:wsjia@gzu.edu.cn
作者简介:Hua-Xin Chen,E-mail:chx2020zyx@163.com

An Approximation Theorem and Generic Uniqueness of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium for Multiobjective Population Games

Hua-Xin Chen^1,2, Wen-Sheng Jia^1,2

1 School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyan 550025, Guizhou, China;
2 Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory for Games Decision-Making and Control Systems, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China

Received:2023-11-15 Revised:2024-08-27 Online:2026-06-30 Published:2026-07-06
Contact: Wen-Sheng Jia E-mail:wsjia@gzu.edu.cn
Supported by:
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 12061020), the Science and Technology Foundation of Guizhou Province (No. 20215640).

摘要/Abstract

Abstract: We mainly study an approximation theorem and generic uniqueness of weakly ParetoNash equilibrium (PNE) for multiobjective population games. First, we define the concept of approximate weakly PNE of multiobjective population games. Then, an approximation theorem is proved under very mild conditions. Furthermore, we prove the generic uniqueness of weakly PNE for multiobjective population games by establishing a function space. Finally, we obtain the generic uniqueness of weakly PNE for multiobjective population games in the case of function perturbation. The above results are new and improve the related results of the recent literature.

Key words: Multiobjective population game, Approximation theorem, Weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium

中图分类号:

. [J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2026, 14(2): 591-602.

Hua-Xin Chen, Wen-Sheng Jia. An Approximation Theorem and Generic Uniqueness of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium for Multiobjective Population Games[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2026, 14(2): 591-602.

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An Approximation Theorem and Generic Uniqueness of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium for Multiobjective Population Games

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