Inspired by the work of population games, we establish the model of population production economies with external increasing returns and introduce the notion of competitive equilibria. We first prove the existence of competitive equilibria under some regular assumptions. Furthermore, we assume that there exists the cooperative behavior of different populations. By proving the existence of transferable utility (TU) core, we analyze the benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns.
Zhe Yang, Xian Zhang
. Competitive Equilibria and Benefit Distributions of Population Production Economies with External Increasing Returns[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2021
, 9(4)
: 723
-740
.
DOI: 10.1007/s40305-021-00340-1
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