For the marriage model with indifferences, we define an equivalence relation over the stable matching set. We identify a sufficient condition, the closing property, under which we can extend results of the classical model (without indifferences) to the equivalence classes of the stable matching set. This condition allows us to extend the lattice structure over classes of equivalences and the rural hospital theorem.
Noelia Juarez, Jorge Oviedo
. Stable Matchings in the Marriage Model with Indifferences[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2021
, 9(3)
: 593
-617
.
DOI: 10.1007/s40305-020-00315-8
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