In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vilnius, pp 151–153, 1973) axiomatized the well-known Shapley value by means of consistency property with reference to a specifically chosen reduced game. The goal of this paper is to generalize Sobolev’s consistency approach to the class of efficient, symmetric and linear values.
Jun Su, Theo S. H. Driessen, Gen-Jiu Xu
. Generalizations of Sobolev’s Consistency and Values for TU-Games[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2021
, 9(2)
: 344
-357
.
DOI: 10.1007/s40305-019-00279-4
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