In this paper, we first generalize Yang and Ju's (J Glob Optim 65:563-573, 2016) result in Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Second, we introduce the model of leader-follower games with infinitely many leaders and followers, that is, infiniteleader-infinite-follower game. We next introduce the notion of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games and prove the existence result.
Zhe Yang, Qing-Bin Gong
. Existence of Weakly Cooperative Equilibria for Infinite-Leader-Infinite-Follower Games[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2019
, 7(4)
: 643
-654
.
DOI: 10.1007/s40305-018-0236-0
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