The Myerson Value on Local Structures of Coalitions

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  • School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

Received date: 2018-08-29

  Revised date: 2019-01-10

  Online published: 2019-10-08

Abstract

The Myerson value introduced by Mayerson (Math Oper Res 2:225-229, 1977) is a solution for cooperative games under the partial cooperation structures described by graphs, in which feasible coalitions are connected but their structures are ignored. To extend the Myerson value, we define a mapping to describe local structures of coalitions and obtain a new solution for cooperative games, called Myerson value with local structures. We propose an axiomatic characterization of the Myerson value associated with local cooperative structures.

Cite this article

Daniel Li Li, Er-Fang Shan . The Myerson Value on Local Structures of Coalitions[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2019 , 7(3) : 461 -473 . DOI: 10.1007/s40305-019-00254-z

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