Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

doi:10.1007/s40305-022-00446-0

Journal of the Operations Research Society of China ›› 2024, Vol. 12 ›› Issue (1): 243-263.doi: 10.1007/s40305-022-00446-0

Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

Lei Wang^1,2, Cui Liu², Hong-Wei Gao², Chong Lin¹

1. School of Automation, Institute of Complexity Science, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, Shandong, China;
2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, Shandong, China

Received:2021-11-28 Revised:2022-09-09 Online:2024-03-30 Published:2024-03-13
Contact: Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Hong-Wei Gao, Chong Lin E-mail:leiwang@qdu.edu.cn;2017020693@qdu.edu.cn;gaohongwei@qdu.edu.cn;linchong_2004@hotmail.com
Supported by:
This research was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72171126), China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 2016M600525), and Qingdao Postdoctoral Application Research Project (No. 2016029).

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, the irrational-behavior-proof conditions in a class of stochastic dynamic games over event trees are presented. Four kinds of irrational-behavior-proof conditions are proposed by the imputation distribution procedure, and their relationships are discussed. More specific properties for the general transformation of characteristic functions are developed, based on which, the irrational-behavior-proof conditions are proved to be true in a transformed cooperative game.

Key words: Dynamic cooperative game, Event tree, Irrational-behavior-proof condition, Imputation distribution procedure, Transformation of characteristic function

CLC Number:

91A12
91A25

Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Hong-Wei Gao, Chong Lin. Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees[J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2024, 12(1): 243-263.

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Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

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